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BOOK REVIEW
THE MEMOmS OF EARL WARREN.

By Earl Warren. Garden City, New York:

Doubleday and Co. 1977. Pp. 394. $12.95.
Earl Warren: A PartialDissent
L.A. PowE,JR. t
Earl Warren was a remarkable man. His political career lasted more
than four decades and saw him moving from district attorney to state
attorney general to governor to Chief Justice of the United States. It
demonstrated not only continuous advancement, but a genuine capacity for
growth. He was good in each job, better in the next. The Court over which
he presided for sixteen years quickly became known as the Warren Court,
and he symbolized its values well: a deep and unwavering commitment to
bringing forth and maintaining an open representative democracy and, more
fundamentally, to guaranteeing the judicial implementation of the four
words chiseled above the entrance of the Supreme Court Building-' 'Equal
Justice Under Law."
By the time Warren retired there was little rational dissent from the
proposition that he was one of the greatest individuals ever to grace the
Supreme Court.' That was eight years ago. Normally some re-evaluation of
any significant figure takes place within the decade after he leaves public
life. Since there was little room for Earl Warren to advance, one would have
expected some questioning of the dimensions of his stature and accomplishments. Yet, with large thanks to his mean-spirited successor, Warren
Burger, and the restocked Court, Earl Warren's reputation is even better
today than it was when he retired. 2 This increase in respect is nothing short
of unbelievable; but that is the type of man Earl Warren was.
t Professor of Law, University of Texas; B.A. 1965, Yale University; J.D. 1968,
University of Washington.
1. See Mersky & Blaustein, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 1183, 1184
(1972).
2. A forthcoming study that surveyed law professors, historians and political scientists

found Warren ranked as the fourth greatest Supreme Court Justice. He was also ranked fourth
by the respondents in each of the separate disciplines. Fleming & Owens, The Great, Near-

Great, and Not-So-Great: Rankings of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices (unpublished) (copy on
file with author). I wish to thank the authors for allowing me to use their results prior to
publication.

1978]

BOOK REVIEW

Now, three years after his death, The Memoirs of Earl Warren has
been published. 3 The reader begins it with high expectations and a long list
of questions. Was the typical perception of Earl Warren as hard working,
honest, genial, uncomplicated, somewhat bland, devoted to his family and
dedicated to the values that made America great an accurate one?4 According to this view, Warren was the perfect embodiment of the concept of
justice, going so far as to look exactly like a Chief Justice should look.- If
this portrait is not correct, what additional dimensions must be added, which
of these traits is misplaced? How did Warren survive so well politically?
How did he face difficult decisions? What did he perceive to be the function
of the Supreme Court?
Answers to these questions must wait for a critical biography of
Warren, for they are not to be found in his memoirs. Indeed the memoirs are
as disappointing a document as it would have been possible for Warren to
produce. They lack balance and fail to face the difficult questions that faced
Warren the politician. The memoirs add virtually no information to that
which is available in other sources. 6 They lack any insight into Warren's
public acts. Furthermore, the memoirs are surprisingly defensive and selfserving. Other men may have committed errors, but it was hard for Earl
Warren to think of-or at least admit to-any of his own. The man whose
place in history seems so secure wrote a ponderous, extended apology.
These memoirs do their author no justice.
THE PUBLIC RECORD
The memoirs give extensive consideration to Warren's years as district
attorney and attorney general. In fact the book is approaching its half-way
point before his election as governor.7 Why? Perhaps because these were
good years for Warren and he remembers them as such. Upholding law and
driving out corruption present inescapable issues of right and wrong.
Warren's actions in these positions were clearly right both at the time and at
the bar of history. Furthermore, most of the participants in these events are
probably dead now. They are easier to deal with than those involved with
Warren later in his career who are either alive or well remembered. Finally,
Warren may have emphasized his first position because the latter years of
3. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN (1977) [hereinafter cited as MEMOIRS].
4. This perception is well presented in J. WEAVER, WARREN (1967).
5. See generally id. at 7, 37, 347.
6. Weaver's biography is the most notable and informative of the sources. J. WEAVER,
supra note 4.
7. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 165.
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his career were contentious times. Warren desired to fight few personal
battles in his memoirs. He had always preferred not to hurt people.8 Thus,
unlike most memoirs, Warren's are not especially anecdotal.
The book's longest chapter is entitled "Problems to Overcome," 9 and
that title sets the tone for Warren's view of his governorship. Although
Warren devoted almost thirty percent of the memoirs to his eleven years in
this position, these pages present little of interest from either a state or
national perspective. His emphasis as governor was on two interrelated
objectives. There would be open government with a nonpartisan approach to
public service and it would bring with it a search for the best men (the term
is used accurately), 10 regardless of party affiliation, and a desire to bring the
necessary services to a state that was almost doubling in population. " With
California's five million new residents 12 came an economic boom beyond
anyone's hopes, and Warren benefited from the fact that governing is
always easier during prosperity. Still, there is little doubt that any state
would have felt blessed with Earl Warren as governor.
Nevertheless, it is as a Chief Justice that Warren will be remembered.
First and foremost, he brought his commitment to racial equality to the
Court. 13 Beyond that he reversed the Court's direction-as well as a stance
he took while governor-on malapportioned legislatures.1 4 During his tenure sharp prosecutorial practices, some not unknown to District Attorney
Warren, were invalidated and the hysteria of McCarthyism eventually met a
judicial check. The latter two areas, however, receive scant treatment in the
memoirs. 15 Instead, Warren concentrates on the first two, contending that
8. The editors quote Justice Douglas: "Even in private conversations he never leveled
off at an antagonist or denounced him." Id. prologue at xii. There are some exceptions to
Warren's general reluctance to lash out at others. See note 15 infra.
9. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 167-236.
10. In a 14 page index with two columns of small print the names of only 32 women

appear. Of these, 8 were related to Warren, 15 were simply wives, mothers or daughters, and 3
were secretaries. The remaining 6 were Helen Gahagan Douglas, Queen Mother Elizabeth,

Queen Elizabeth II, Constance Baker Motley, Bessie Ferguson (a victim in a murder case) and
Mrs. Agnes Meyer, a person who hosted the Warrens and Adlai Stevenson on "some wonderful
summer cruises. . . through the Greek islands and in other parts of the Mediterranean." Id.at
259.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 116-214.
Id. at 207.
See text accompanying notes 17-24 infra.
See text accompanying notes 39-47 infra.

15. The criminal procedure cases were quite properly set in the context of equal justice for
the poor. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 316-17.

(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] was of no assistance to hardened underworld types because they already know what their rights are and demand them. And so
it is with all sophisticated criminals and affluent prisoners who had ready access to
their lawyers. However, because so many people who are arrested are poor and

illiterate, short-cut methods and often cruelties are perpetrated to obtain convictions.
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they were the Court's most significant accomplishments. 16
The discussion of the race cases is more extensive than the other
material about the Court years. 17 Most of it, of necessity, deals with Brown
8 and its aftermath. Yet, if one wants to learn about
v. Board of Education"
the Court's deliberations leading to the Brown decision, one should read
some other book. Warren portrays the process as relatively easy. The Court
experienced no "dissension," but rather a testing of arguments. 19 Unnamed
Justices occasionally acted as "devil's advocates,"20 helping the Court to
move toward a unanimous position that could secure "enthusiastic" adherence. 21 With a modesty uncharacteristic of the memoirs as a whole, Warren
downplays his own role. He does so, however, without adding to the roles
of the others. 22 The credibility of such a picture is not great, because this
was a momentous case in which reargument was necessary. Moreover, after
the presentation of the Court's negotiations in Richard Kluger's Simple
Justice,23 this depiction is best ignored. Warren made a conscious choice
not to take credit when it was richly deserved; unfortunately, by so doing he
obscured the Court's decisionmaking process.
The Brown opinions were carefully negotiated compromises and as
such contain many ambiguities. Unfortunately, Warren's memoirs do not
clarify the legal or historical questions raised by Brown any further than his
two opinions did. 24
Id. Although Warren spends considerable space on McCarthyism and the Court's defense of

the first amendment, see, e.g., id. at 318-19, one really learns little from it. In part the
discussion demonstrates what many conservatives found offensive about the Warren Court.
Another part is aimed at settling old scores. His memoirs are the only time Warren takes on the

John Birch Society-in many ways too easy a mark. Id. at 303-06. Eisenhower also takes the
brunt of a story. When he and Warren were aboard Air Force One in the 1960's heading to

Winston Churchill's funeral, Eisenhower singled out the Communist cases-none of which he

had read-as the area in which Brennan and Warren had disappointed him. Warren rather
happily tells of narrowing Eisenhower's objection to a single case-Yates v. United States, 354

U.S. 298 (1957)-and then noting "with some satisfaction" that it was written by John Marshall
Harlan, an Eisenhower appointee of whom the general thought well. MEMOIRS, supra at 5-6.

The memoirs also even a score with the American Bar Association. Warren states in detail
the circumstances leading up to his resignation from the organization and strongly contends that
he was sandbagged into attending an ABA meeting in London at which intense criticism of the
Court surfaced. Id. at 321-31.
16. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 281-303, 306-10.
17. Id. at 281-303.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 4.
22. Id.at 2-4.
23. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678-99 (1976).
24. See the particularly arresting statement discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294 (1955) (implementation decision): "neither local law nor custom should be permitted
to interfere with the establishment of an integrated school system . . . with 'all deliberate
speed'--a phrase which has been much discussed by those who are of the opinion that

412
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Momentous though Brown was, Warren always felt that the reapportionment cases were more significant. As one reads his memoirs this
conclusion appears somewhat surprising because it conflicts with his views
on the legislative process. Two years before he died Warren published a
short primer on democratic government complete with exhortations and
optimism,' but the reader of Warren's memoirs will see few similarities
between the two books. Indeed, the reader of Warren's memoirs might well
wonder about American democracy and especially about the most democratic of all branches of government, the legislature. Hugo Black's love for and
faith in the legislative process is found nowhere in Earl Warren. Instead, one
sees an attitude that varies from contempt for to distrust of the legislative
26
process.
The seeds of Warren's attitude developed early. Immediately after
World War I, he says, he asked an old friend who had once been an
assemblyman what he thought of Warren's job as clerk of the judiciary
committee. Noting Warren's age the same way many adults note children's
ages before telling them the "facts of life," the friend responded: "I guess
it is all right. . . . You are probably old enough now to be disillusioned as
to man-made law.'"27 He was indeed old enough, and the disillusion would
become strong. Warren follows the story by noting that he thought of "this
advice or admonition, whichever was intended, hundreds of times as I
observed the process of legislation, the tricks of the trade, the lobbying, and
what seemed to be downright corruption by some." 28 Lobbyists and their
ability to dominate the legislature were his primary concern.
[Paid lobbyists] frequently operate in dark passageways, hotel
rooms, and through entertainment of various kinds. Also, because
their job is with legislators, they often try to convince them that the
best way to get what they want is to disdain the governor and hold
back his legislation until their bills are agreed to by him. Too often,
the Legislature succumbs to such blandishments and clogs the
machinery so that no important legislation is enacted until the
closing hours of the term, and then only with the so-called "bugs"
that creep into it unknown to the general public, or even to many of
the legislators.2 9
Warren's complaint was thus two-fold. First, lobbyists dominate the
legislature and second, legislators often do not know what they are doing.
desegregation has not proceeded" swiftly enough. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 288 (emphasis
added).
25.
26.
27.
28.

E. WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (1972).
See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 53.
Id.

29. Id. at 174.
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Bills can be rushed through3" or held back until the whole process is jammed
with legislation;3 1 in either case the underlying justifications for the legislation are unexplored. How different a process it was from that of either the
executive or the judicial branches-especially from the judiciary, the branch
in which "processes are more available to the public" 32 and dispassionate
33
reflection "on the facts" leads to the final outcome.
Warren's distaste for the legislature went beyond the theoretical. War34
ren, like all strong governors, was "often in trouble with the legislature."
As the legislators did not appreciate his wisdom sufficiently, he did not trust
them. The legislature was hectic, uncontemplative and untrustworthy. Warren would not bargain with it35 and he fought to keep his office separate
from it. 36
With Congress it was little different. Warren and the Court were
constantly under attack for putting blacks into the schools, taking God out
and coddling Communists and criminals. As he noted, "Many politicians
made anti-Supreme Court sentiment a basis of their campaigns for election,
and some with long careers in high office maintained their tenure by such an
appeal." 37 The combination of political opposition to Warren-something
he neither understood nor tolerated well-and lobbyist domination made the
legislature a combination of two of Warren's strongest dislikes. It is no
wonder that his two discussions of separation of powers emphasize the need
38
to maintain the independence of his office.
What is a wonder is that Warren consistently maintained that Baker v.
Carr,39 not Brown v. Board of Education, was his most significant decision. 4I It has frequently been noted that Warren's position on reapportionment was inconsistent with the one he took as Governor of California. 41 In
the memoirs Warren dismisses this earlier stance as "frandy a matter of
30. Id. at 175.
31.

[W]e were in the closing days of a regular session of our Legislature. As usual,

much important legislation was floundering around in committees or conferences
awaiting the rush in the closing days when vital changes can be made without drawing
immediate public attention because of the confusion that attends adjournment.
Id. at 262.
32. Id. at 335.

33. Id. at 337.
34. Id. at 232.
35. Id. at 174. "When it comes t6 a trading game, the Legislature holds most of the cards,
and with the aid of the lobbyists can use them devastatingly." Id. at 238.
36. Id. at 238.
37. Id. at 319.

38. See id. at 169-70, 341-42. "[T]he constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
was designed in large part to protect the independence of the judiciary .
39. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 306.
41. Id. at 309-10.

Id. at 341.

..
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political expediency.''42 Given his views of the legislative process one
would hardly have expected him to waste his political capital tinkering with
the process of selecting legislators who would then yield to the various
lobbyists. Why then strike out on such a course at the Court? Warren's
explanation is straightforward enough. He cites the practical effects of
malapportionment in Tennessee-Memphis was virtually disenfranchised
and it was impossible to do away with minority rule without the minority's
express consent. 43 He also cites some theoretical reasons for eliminating
44
malapportionment, backing them up with Lincoln's Gettysburg Address
45
and a few less artful quotes from his own Reynolds v. Sims. Finally, he
notes that he was told by a Justice "from one of the more populous states"
that he was informed by a lobbyist "that in order to stop any legislation
disapproved by the lobbyist's clients, it was only necessary for him to
control the votes of nine senators, and they could be from the least populous
counties.'
It is conceivable that Warren concluded, despite his lack of
faith in the legislative process, that the easily influenced legislature he had
known was not inevitable and that improvement might be possible. But
improvement could be effected only by judicial implementation of the one
type of change the legislatures themselves were least likely to implement.
In Reynolds, Warren wrote: "Legislators represent people, not trees or
acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic
interests." 4 7 Yet he believed just the opposite. Reynolds was the expression
of his ideal for democracy. Maybe he felt that its implementation would
reduce the ability of lobbyists to influence the legislative process. The
memoirs do not make it clear, however, whether Warren thought the
reapportionment cases had any real effects beyond simply changing patterns
of representation. As a successful politician in a state noted for political
fluidity he may well have assumed there would be such an effect; nothing in
his makeup indicates that he would be willing to support a theoretical goal
that had no practical consequences.
The biggest disappointment of the memoirs is that so much of significance in understanding the whole picture of Warren's career is omitted.
Even some of the episodes included are virtually skimmed over.
42. Id. at 310.

43. Id. at 307 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
44. Id. at 308.
45. 377 U.S. 533 (1964), quoted in MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 308.
46. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 307. The possible justices would be Frankfurter (Mas-

sachusetts), although this seems incredibly unlikely, Brennan (New Jersey), Stewart (Ohio),
Harlan (New York) and Clark (Texas). Assuming that the numerical reference was to a onethird margin of the state's senate, it does not fit the size of any of those states' senates at that
time. The number given was close to one-third of the New Jersey Senate, however, and
Brennan was the author of Baker v. Carr.
47. 377 U.S. at 562.
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The two events of Warren's career as a state politician that probably
bear the greatest relation to Warren's later career were the Japanese relocation4" and the S.S. Point Lobos murder. 49 Both are mentioned for several
pages. Yet neither account is satisfactory.
There is little doubt that Warren's stance on the Japanese relocation is
the best remembered position he took as a state official. He, like President
Roosevelt and Justices Black and Douglas (to mention those with the best
liberal credentials), was on the wrong side of the most massive blight on
civil liberties in American history. Of the four of them, only Warren
admitted what everyone knows: they erred. In his memoirs he reiterates his
regrets about the incident. 50 Given this position, which is commendable
compared to that of other major figures involved, one might expect some
discussion on the problems of responsibility during a crisis. Warren provides a watered-down version of this by stating that the incident demonstrates "the cruelty of war when fear, get-tough military psychology,
propaganda, and racial antagonism combine with one's responsibility for
public security to produce such acts.' '51 This reads somewhat like a justification for his actions; that suspicion is confirmed both by what is present
and what is absent in the account. Not once does Warren consider whether
the tragic affair could have been avoided if any of the responsible leaders at
either the local or national level had acted as leaders should. Furthermore,
he tries to shift some of the blame to the Japanese-Americans themselves.
Thus, he devotes equal space to his regret and to detailing the "faults" of
the Japanese-Americans.52 He notes that the younger ones 53 went to Japan
for their educations and became "more Japanese by training, indoctrination,
and ideology" than their parents. 54 He also notes that after the order
thousands of Japanese-Americans renounced their loyalty to the United
55
States.
Although less well known than the Japanese relocation, the S.S. Point
Lobos murder and its aftermath also shed light on Warren's subsequent
actions. The case was his most famous prosecution. It concerned a murder
48. See MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 148-49.
49. See id.at 113-17.
50. Id. at 148-49.
51. Id. Compare his 1943 statement: "If the Japs are released, no one will be able to tell a
saboteur from any other Jap." 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, THEIR LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2728 (1969).
52. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 148-49.
53. Warren never indicates how many younger Japanese-Americans fell into this category.
54. MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 148.

55. Id.at 149.
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that occurred when Harry Bridges' union had closed down the ports. Three
defendants were union officials who allegedly hired the fourth defendant to
beat the decedent "within an inch of his life.''56 All were convicted by a
jury after a long trial.
Many people thought the defendants were innocent, despite the verdict.
It is possible that some of the popular doubts had their genesis in the tactics
of the prosecution. Warren's chief investigator broke into a hotel room,
photographed a letter and then planted a microphone in the room to get
better reception than his earlier attempt to eavesdrop with a stethoscope had
achieved. 57 If these gross fourth amendment violations were not sufficient to
raise doubts about the convictions' validity, there were also allegations that
confessions were coerced both physically and psychologically. 5 Warren
59
barely mentions these tactics and the controversy that surrounded them.
Several years later Governor Culbert Olson pardoned the three union
officials, believing that they had not been guilty. This was one reason
Warren ran against Olson in the next gubernatorial election. 0 But, beyond
noting Olson's pardon and its reason, Warren hardly discusses the criticism
of his prosecution. Instead, he vigorously reprosecutes and again convicts
the defendants in the memoirs. 61 Perhaps many people who sided with the
labor movement in the labor-management controversy believed the defendants innocent for that reason; still, one would like to have heard Warren's
explanation of the situation creating such popular doubts.
One of the S.S. PointLobos prosecution's chief critics was liberal law
professor Max Radin of Berkeley. 62 Several years later this brilliant teacher,
fine scholar and advisor to governor Olson was nominated by Olson to serve
on the state supreme court. His nomination met with a flurry of sharp
criticism suggesting that his leftist leanings were too great. 63 Although past
appointments to the state supreme court had been routinely approved by the
Judicial Qualifications Commission, 64 not so with Radin. After a lengthy
meeting of the three member commission in July 1940, attorney general and
commission member Warren announced: "We have considered all the facts
in connection with the nomination, including the report from the board of
56. J. WEAVER, supra note 4, at 85. A fifth defendant had fled the country. Id. at 84.
57. Id. at 85-86.
58. Id. at 87-89.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 113-16.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 113-16.
J. WEAVER, supra note 4, at 74.
Id. at 71-73.

64. The Judicial Qualifications Commission consisted of California's Chief Justice, its
senior Associate Justice and its attorney general. Id. at 71.
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governors of the State Bar, and we have come to the conclusion that the
nomination should not be confirmed.''65 One would like to know what
factors led to the rejection of the nomination and how they related to
Warren's views on freedom of expression, the standards of police and
prosecutorial conduct and possibly even his strategy for political advancement. But Warren does not even mention Max Radin in his memoirs.
It is harder to take issue with Warren's omission of events that occurred
during the Court years, for these might have been rectified had he lived
longer. While the memoirs do take Warren through his retirement, they are
basically incomplete after 1964.66 He was able to discuss the effort of the
Mitchell Justice Department to use an ex parte contact to overturn the
decision in Alderman v. United States67 -a case concerning a defendant's
access to conversations illegally wiretapped by the government. 68 Yet no
mention is made of Warren's meeting with John Mitchell just seven weeks
69
later when Abe Fortas was being pressured to resign from the Court.
so there is no
Indeed, the Fortas resignation is not mentioned at all,
70
indication of the role Warren played in Fortas' decision.
Warren's own retirement was equally interesting and receives as little
treatment in the memoirs. His letter to President Johnson stated he would
retire at Johnson's pleasure, 7 1 an expression Johnson quickly turned into
"effective at such time as a successor is qualified." ' 72 This raised the
intriguing constitutional question whether there was a vacancy that would
allow the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm a new Chief
Justice. It raised political questions as well. There would be little chance of
candid answers to these questions even if Warren had lived longer because
he was a private man, not given to explaining such controversial and
inexplicable events. Nevertheless, an attempt at explanation would have
been fascinating.
65. Id. at 73.
66.
67.
68.
69.

MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 373-77.
394 U.S. 165 (1969).
MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 337-42.
For a discussion of this meeting, see R. SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT 248-49

(1972).
70. According to Shogan's account Warren took
"a very strong position" that Fortas's arrangement with Wolfson "should not have

happened." His feelings were intensified by the untimeliness of the disclosure-only a
month preceding his retirement from the Court after sixteen years of service. He could

not help but look upon the incident "as a blot on the image of the Warren Court."
Id. at 249.

Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to President Lyndon Johnson (June 13, 1968),
MERSKY & M. JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOMINATIONS 1916-72, at 382 (1975).
72. Letter from President Lyndon Johnson to Chief Justice Earl Warren (June 26, 1968),
reproduced in R. MERSKY & M. JACOBSTEIN, supra note 71, at 383.
71.

reproduced in 9A R.
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Finally, the memoirs contain no discussion at all of Warren's philosophy of judging. His commitment to equality comes through easily, but there
was more. He made the question, "But is it fair?" famous. 73 Implicit in this
question was Warren's strong sense that fairness in procedure was essential
in a free country. He fused his concern for equality, his demand for fairness

and his own concept of decency into an operative philosophy. He made the
Constitution represent the best of what he thought America stood for. His

Court enforced a decency in police actions, 74 and, since the nation and states
had a right "to maintain a decent society"75 if they wished, actions directed
toward this goal found a constitutional sanction. Decency is an elusive

concept, but for Warren at least a decent society protected children from
obscenity76 and from situations in which they might be coerced into participating in religious activities. 77 With adults more leeway could be tolerated,
but still society could legislate a family day of repose, 78 suppress flag
burning7 9 and crack down on commercial exploitation of sex 0 and gambling.81 Warren's feelings on these subjects were strongly held. 2 His belief
in a blend of morality and old fashioned patriotism as the basis of decent
society was so strong that, absent serious government overreaching, 8 3 he

was willing to participate in judicial vigilante justice against defendants who
flagrantly violated his norms. 84 Again, it would have been useful if Warren
73. See, e.g., Rodell, It Is the Earl Warren Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1966, § 6
(Magazine), at 30.
74. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
75. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
76. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
77. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (Regent's Prayer). Despite the Court's doctrinal disavowals of reliance on
coercion, 374 U.S. at 223; 370 U.S. at 430, it seems that potential coercion was an obvious fact
in the public school situation.
78. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S 420 (1961).
79. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
80. Ginzburg v. United-States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
496 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
81. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 77 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
82. CompareTinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), with Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); compare Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S.
70 (1965), with Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 77 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), with Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 463, 494 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring); compare Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948), with Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
83. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 313 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
84. Although Justice Brennan wrote the opinion affirming Ralph Ginzburg's conviction,
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), there seems little doubt that Warren was the
driving force behind the creation of that ex post facto finding of guilt. In the case of David
O'Brien, O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), it is arguable that Warren's theory of
the case was never applied to its facts, but this judicial technique is not sufficiently unusual to
warrant singling out this exercise. The shocking aspect of O'Brien was that the Court's mandate
reinstated the district court's conviction and did not remand the case to the court of appeals. Id.
at 386. By so doing the Court stripped O'Brien of any appellate review of several non-frivolous
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had discussed his philosophy of interpreting the Constitution. He was
neither theorist nor scholar, but he obviously had views on the translation of
intense beliefs into constitutional law. The memoirs, however, provide no
enlightenment.
PIECING AND PLACING

Earl Warren was a very private man and his memoirs were unrevealing
by choice. The image he intended to present was incomplete. In the process
of its presentation, though, Warren brings forth a second, unappealing-and
unintended-image: that of a man who was insecure, self-serving, unwilling to deal analytically with the tough decisions he had faced or with the
living people who might fight his interpretations. There is so much selfcentered discussion in the memoirs that his basic concern for people as
individuals fails to appear. Although there were occasional Max Radin
events in Warren's life,8 5 they were not representative. One cannot read
Weaver's biography8 6 or the moving tributes to Warren in the HarvardLaw
Review8 7 and fail to conclude that Warren loved people and identified with
them. He translated this affection for people into an "ability to personalize
and humanize a factual situation." 88 Thus, litigants were not abstractions
demanding access to the federal courts or swarming hordes swelling the
Court's in forma pauperis docket. Warren felt they were people with
problems that should be solved fairly and justly by the courts. In this he
lacked one quality Thomas Reed Powell ascribed to the legal mind: an
ability to think of one of two inescapably interrelated things without thinking about the other.
Warren was no theoretician. He had no use for theories that ignored
human beings. Doing nothing because some theory of federalism suggested
inaction was the correct approach made no sense to him.8 9 Great ideas that
ignored both reality and people were not such great ideas. Warren said that,
issues initially by-passed by the court of appeals in its disposition of the case. See O'Brien v.
United States, 393 U.S. 900 (1968) (mem.) (petition for rehearing denied without opinion).
85. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra. See also Kopkind, Brennan v. Tigar, 155
NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 1966, at 21 (suggesting Warren may have been involved in Justice
Brennan's wholly unjustified firing of his liberal law clerk Michael Tigar before Tigar even
began work).
86. J. WEAVER, supra note 4.
87. Black, An Impression of the Late ChiefJustice, 88 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1974); Brennan,
Chief Justice Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1974); Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11 (1974);
Pollack, The Legacy of Earl Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 8 (1974).
88. Beytagh, On Earl Warren's Retirement: A Reply to ProfessorKurland, 67 MIcH. L.
REV. 1477, 1483 (1969).

89. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1960) (Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
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" 'No book or professor had a profound influence on me, not even in the
law school. Companionship was the greatest thing I found at the University,
and it still stands out in my mind today as more important than anything I
learned in classes.' "90 He wrote early in his term as Chief Justice, "Our
system faces no theoretical dilemma but a single continuous problem: how
to apply to everchanging conditions the neverchanging principles of freedom." 9' For him there would never be a theoretical dilemma because he
would not let any theory prevent what he felt were wise actions. And he
believed in action. As a governor it was vigorous executive action; as a
Chief Justice the vigor moved over to the judiciary. Ted White captured this
better than anyone: "The fact that initially he had no well-developed
philosophy of judging was in his case of no consequence; he had instead a
well-developed philosophy of governing.' 92
That Earl Warren had many great qualities, especially a concern for
people and an ability to deal effectively and persuasively in small groups,
seems undeniable. His pattern of growth, exhibited each time his responsibilities widened, seems unmatched in modern American history. And his
contributions to the Court-marshalling the unanimity of Brown and writing the opinion, authoring Reynolds, Miranda and Powell v. McCormack,93
providing leadership internally, and willingly taking the public abuse that
was so often directed at the Court-are of a high order. But the order may
not be high enough to justify the current view that he ranks at or near the top
with the greatest Justices of all time. Indeed, it is not clear that he ranks with
four of the Justices who sat on his Court: Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and
94
Harlan.
No list of the qualities constituting judicial greatness could satisfy
everyone. In part, the Justices who have been classified as great were
important to the Court both when they sat and after. They either wrote major
opinions for the Court or, through separate opinions or force of intellect,
pointed the Court to major new developments. They wrote about the fundamental issues facing American democracy, and the positions they took were
important in defining approaches to the never ending problems of accommodating rights and liberties and powers. In many cases they added something extra to the Court. Often that something extra is why Chief Justices
have fared better historically than Associate Justices. Finally, extraordinary
90. J. WEAVER, supra note 4, at 30.
91. Id. at 255.
92. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 337 (1976).
93. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). After considering implications of a presidential impeachment one
wonders how sturdy Powell's political questions analysis is.
94. To use alphabetical order only.
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95
judicial craftsmanship has normally been exhibited by these Justices.
Using these criteria, one must strain to make a case for Warren's greatness.
Beyond a handful of cases one does not think of Warren as the author of
major opinions. And if his positions on fundamental issues are seen as
contributing to his greatness, it should be noted that Douglas and Black had
years earlier, and that Brennan took these
staked most of these positions out
96
Warren.
as
strongly
as
positions
The case for Warren's greatness will not soon be made any better than
was
made by Abe Fortas. The gist of Fortas' position was expressed in
it
two marvelously conceived paragraphs:
Objective analysis is generally useful, but often essentially
spurious. It is easy analytically to dissect the work of the Warren
Court and Warren's significance to it and to arrive at misleading
conclusions. The fact is that the Warren Court was both the product and a producer of a profound moral, ethical and constitutional
revolution. It functioned in times when the demand for a full
measure of human rights had become insistent. Our Constitution,
our Bill of Rights, had promised that our government would accord
that full measure. "Time had set its face" against an apartheid
society, against a selective application of constitutional principle,
against a half-a-loaf version of the noble generalities of our social
compact. And it was the Warren Court that was the instrument and
the motor of time's insistence.
Earl Warren, I think, was essential to the Court's response. I
cannot prove this by quantitative or objective evidence. His contribution cannot be tallied. He provided an essence, an attitude,
which set the tone and quality of the Court's work. In a sense, he
was a simple man. His constant question was: Is this right or
wrong? His answer was always firmly rooted in a profound sense
of justice and human dignity, and in a simple and uncomplicated
of the essential, noble meaning of our Constitution's
conception
97
precepts.
Part of the elusiveness of Warren's greatness comes from the problems
of separating the man from the Court. This must be done before one can
evaluate the man individually, yet what is so distinctive about Earl Warren
is how perfectly he symbolized his Court. If symbolism arose simply
95. Craftmanship, however, fascinates law professors more than others and therefore

does not seem as important as the other criteria.
96. See Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 TEx. L. REv. 608, 609 (1970) (Brennan
was "clearly the Most Valuable Player of the era"). Blasi's conclusion that the most lasting
contribution the Warren Court would have was the generation of lawyers it spawned has lost
none of its force. Id. at 622-23.
97. Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 YALE L.J. 405, 411
(1975).
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because Warren was the Chief Justice and voted with the majority in the
significant cases, then it would be hard to justify any special claim to
greatness. On the other hand, if he symbolized the Court because he was
essential to its work and was a personification of its efforts, then a good case
can be made that he was great because his Court was great. The truth
probably lies somewhere between the two, although closer to the latter than
the former. A fascinating aspect of an evaluation of Earl Warren is the desire
to praise and the difficulty bf supplying supporting data. Symbolism provides him with tremendous leverage in this process, but this is a leverage
that is not necessary for the other giants of his era.
That Earl Warren has probably been overrated as a Justice does not
make him a less important historical study. He is one of the major figures of
modem American political life, a man who acted, occasionally erred,
always learned and steadily grew. A well-written set of memoirs would have
been a wonderful legacy to leave a public that grows more cynical about
politicians, law students who see the efforts to bring justice to all slipping
away term by term, and future biographers to whom the responsibility for
piecing together a whole and complex man will fall. Unfortunately, Warren
did not produce such a memoir. He could have helped us understand the
tumultuous times through which we have lived. Because of the significance
of the work Warren could have produced the disappointment in his failure to
do so is all the greater.

